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USIB-D-24.7/5

17 August 1967

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Report of the Ad Hoc Interagency Committee to
Prepare Documentation of Communist Use of
Cambodia in Support of the War in South Vietnam

REFERENCE : USIB-M-468, 23 March 1967, Item 6

1. The attached report has been prepared by an ad hoc interagency committee chaired by Mrs. Evelyn S. Colbert, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, pursuant to the reference Board action of 23 March 1967 in response to the request by the Joint State/DoD/CIA Study Group on Cambodia.

2. The report consists of:

a. Mrs. Colbert's transmittal memorandum which discusses the sources of intelligence used and questions involved in declassification, in relation to the proposed use of the report by the Joint Study Group.

b. A paper entitled "Infiltration" which covers units, routes, and logistic arrangements.

c. A paper entitled "Evidence of VC/NVA Base Areas in Cambodia" which covers areas used by the Communists to take refuge, support the infiltration routes, direct operations in South Vietnam, and conduct cross-border operations. This paper is divided into two sections based on the sources of the evidence.

Noted by USIB (per telephone request) on 30 August.
Recorded in USIB-M-485, Secretary's Note. (See also
attached record of action.)

DIA review(s) completed.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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3. It is planned to schedule the attached report for Board review on the USIB agenda of 31 August 1967.

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Executive Secretary

Attachments

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MEMORANDUM FOR USIB

Subject: Report of the Ad Hoc Interagency Committee to
Prepare Documentation of Communist Use of Cambodia
in Support of the War in South Vietnam

Reference: USIB-M-468

1. I am pleased to transmit herewith two papers documenting Communist use of Cambodia for infiltration and base areas. These papers were prepared by an ad hoc interagency committee established on March 23, 1967 at the direction of USIB in response to the request of the Joint State/DOD/CIA Study Group on Cambodia.

2. In making its request, the Joint Study Group envisaged that material would be selected from these compilations for presentation not only to the Cambodian government and to friendly governments but possibly also to a wider audience. The Joint Study Group therefore requested that the material be so organized as to make clear the relative degrees of sensitivity of the intelligence data included.

3. The ad hoc committee believes that the paper on Infiltration--which covers units, routes, and logistic arrangements--makes a reasonable and convincing case. However, we have little usable evidence for the period after the early months of 1966. This would, of course, somewhat impair the utility of the paper for the purposes contemplated by the Inter-Agency Study Group and the subject will need to be kept under continued review for insertion of later material. We anticipate no major problems of declassification. With the exception of three agent reports identified as such in the text (the deletion of which would not materially affect the paper), the material is derived exclusively from interrogation reports and captured documents. Authority for declassification rests with the US Mission in Saigon.

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4. The paper on Base Areas covers areas used by the Communists to take refuge, support the infiltration routes, direct operations in South Vietnam, and conduct cross-border operations. With declassification problems in view the paper has been divided into two sections. The first section uses only information obtained from captured Communist documents and prisoner and returnee interrogations; the second is based on material obtained from agents (usually classified No Forn) and photographs [redacted]

[redacted] Authority with respect to declassification of photography and material based on photography rests with NPIC, and with respect to agent reports used in these studies with MACV through DIA/Collections Office. In terms of plausibility to the intended audience, we believe that the captured documents and interrogations are the most convincing of our data. [redacted]

[redacted] The agent report material--which we have used extremely selectively--although voluminous and of intelligence value, does not easily lend itself to the development of a comprehensive case that would be persuasive to foreign governments or other consumers.

Evelyn S. Colbert
Evelyn S. Colbert, INR
Chairman

Committee Members:

[redacted] CIA/OCI
[redacted] CIA/OCI
CIA/OER
CIA/OER
CIA/OER
DIA
[redacted] DIA
Tadao Kobayashi INR

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INFILTRATION

Units

The interrogation reports of North Vietnamese prisoners of war, involving at least 80 regular army personnel, provide conclusive evidence that the Communists use Cambodian territory to infiltrate to South Vietnam. It is possible to document this movement through Cambodia from as early as July 1961, but during that year and the subsequent three years, it probably did not take place in large numbers. Since October 1964, however, when North Vietnamese infiltrators began to arrive in South Vietnam in organized units, at least 11 out of the 21 regiments and 5 out of the 28 battalions confirmed to have reached South Vietnam have trekked through Cambodia. The total strength of these units which have used Cambodia is in excess of 19,000 men. In addition, at least 8 other North Vietnamese units are known to have infiltrated through Cambodia, but their identities, other than the cover designations used during infiltration, are not yet known.

Between the last quarter of 1964 and the first quarter of 1966, four regiments moved between October 1964 and April 1965; three regiments and a battalion between July and October 1965; and four regiments and a battalion between December 1965 and March or April 1966.

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Listed below in chronological order are the North Vietnamese units which have infiltrated through Cambodia during their southward trek. According to prisoner of war reports, the units spent between a few days to more than two weeks in traversing Cambodian territory, presumably just before the date given for their arrival in South Vietnam:

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<u>Regiments</u>	<u>Subordinate Battalions</u>	<u>Infiltration Data</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Current Location</u>
95th	4th, 5th, and 6th	Dep NVN Oct 64 Arr SVN Dec 64	2,000	Phu Yen
32d	344th, 635th, and 966th	Dep NVN Sep-Oct 64 Arr SVN Jan 65	1,800	Kontum
101st	1st, 2d, and 3d	Dep NVN Dec 64 Arr SVN Feb 65	2,000	Binh Long
18th	4th, 5th, and 6th	Dep NVN Feb 65 Arr SVN Apr 65	2,000	Binh Dinh
33d	K1, K2, and K3	Dep NVN Jul 65 Arr SVN Oct 65	2,000	Kontum
250th	D1, D2, and D3	Dep NVN Jul 65 Arr SVN Oct 65	1,000	Disbanded
66th	7th, 8th, and 9th	Dep NVN Jul-Aug 65 Arr SVN Oct 65	1,500	Pleiku
18B	7th, 8th, and 9th	Dep NVN Dec 65 Arr SVN Feb 66	2,000	Phu Yen
141st	1st, 2d, and 3d	Dep NVN Jan 66 Arr SVN Mar 66	1,500	Phuoc Long
24th	4th, 5th, and 6th	Dep NVN Jan 66 Arr SVN Mar 66	2,000	Kontum
52d	5th, 1st	Dep NVN Feb 66	1,500	Unknown
<u>Battalions</u>				
H-13 AA/NT-1 Div		Dep NVN Sep 65 Arr SVN Jan 66	400	Pleiku
15th Eng/NT-1 Div		Dep NVN Aug 65 Arr SVN Nov 65	230	Pleiku
16th Sig/NT-1 Div		Dep NVN Nov 65 Arr SVN Feb 66	200	Pleiku
19th Trans/NT-1 Div		Dep NVN Jul 65 Arr SVN Sep 65	300	Pleiku
18th Med/NT-1 Div		Dep NVN Aug 65 Arr SVN Unk	200	Pleiku

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Routes

In the early sixties, the great bulk of infiltrators to South Vietnam probably avoided use of Cambodia. Infiltration trails extended from southern Laos directly into South Vietnam, thence along the border region adjacent to the Cambodian provinces of Ratanakiri and Mondulakiri. At some point in time, however, the trails in southeastern Laos were extended across the northeastern tip of Cambodia near the tri-border area, then after entering South Vietnam, proceeded in a southern direction in Kontum province of South Vietnam to the Tonle San River in Cambodia.

--Pham Hong Ha (1st Company, 1st Battalion, 101st Regiment, 325th Division; captured 2 November 1965) related that he arrived at the Cambodian border in September 1965. He walked through Cambodia for four days and encamped in northeastern Cambodia for two days before proceeding to Kontum province, South Vietnam. He subsequently traveled southward in South Vietnam and recrossed the Cambodian border into Ratanakiri province. In September 1965, Ha again crossed the border into Pleiku province, South Vietnam. /1

From the Se San River the trails continued along the Cambodian side of the border, crossed the river and Route 19, and headed toward the Chu Pong mountain.

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--Do Van Nhung (2nd Battalion, 101st Regiment, 325th Division). According to Nhung, he entered Cambodia on 15 September 1965 at YA 562593. He proceeded along the border toward the Chu Pong mountain area at YV 831971. During his travels through Cambodia he observed three way-stations manned by North Vietnamese. Each station had two houses with a thatched roof made of jungle vegetation for camouflage. His unit stayed at each station for one day. /2

--Vi Van Ty (infiltrator with the 13th Company, 608th Battalion 250A Regiment). Ty's unit reportedly passed through Laos, Kontum province (SVN), and Cambodia in that order before re-entering South Vietnam's Quang Duc province. According to Ty it took twenty days to travel through Cambodia (5-10 December 1965-1 January 1966). While in Cambodia, Ty indicated that their resting stations had been used before and that the trail the unit used was old and narrow. A number of men in the unit had malaria, some died, some were left along the route of march. Source stated that when his unit reached the Cambodian-Quang Duc province (SVN) border they rested for six days. The unit subsequently crossed into South Vietnam where it took up the mission of obtaining rice from Cambodia. /3

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This alignment of trails existed at least until mid-1965. Later that year, as a result of increased allied sweep operations in Kontum and Pleiku provinces in South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese appear to have shifted to use of infiltration routes almost wholly on the Cambodian side of the border.

--Dinh Van My (Viet Cong affiliated with 21st Company, 66th Regiment, 304th Division; captured 24 November 1965, Pleiku province). My relates that while in Cambodia the 21st Company was told by their commanding officer that the unit had arrived in neutral Cambodia, where American airplanes were not allowed and therefore they would be safe while traveling. Source claims to have met ethnic tribesmen who acted totally indifferent toward the North Vietnamese soldiers. Source's unit used four ethnic North Vietnamese and one Cambodian speaking guide. ^{/4}

--Pham Hong Ha (1st Company, 1st Battalion, 101st Regiment, 325th Division; captured 2 November 1965, Pleiku province) described the infiltration route and the various stations along the trail. Ha made numerous station stops in Cambodian territory (vicinities of YA 541800, YA 506690, YA 490575, YA 490457, YA 585365, YA 620184, YA 689075, and YV 770980). Ha indicated that the trail had been used by previous infiltrating units and it was impossible to be seen from the air due to the jungle canopy. Ha remembered having crossed the Se San River and Route 19. When crossing the latter his commanding officer reportedly identified the route. ^{/5}

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--Do Van Tranh (member of the 1st Company, 602nd Battalion of the 250th Regiment; captured 29 January 1966, Phuoc Long province). Tranh traveled in Cambodia during September 1965 and crossed into South Vietnam somewhere in Phuoc Long province. While in Cambodia, source's unit followed a route approximately 10 kilometers to the west of the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. According to Tranh there were 15 to 20 stations in Cambodia; the unit spent one day at each station to cook, rest, and obtain water. /6

--Reportedly on 20 June 1966 a Viet Cong base camp was located on the east side of Nam Lyr Mountain near the Dak Nrao stream in the vicinity of YU 775855. This camp was approximately 150 meters square and consisted of ten houses. Reportedly every three or four months a large unit moved through the camp area and into South Vietnam.* /7

The infiltration routes then extended from the Nam Lyr Mountain area southward into South Vietnam. There are some indications that routes also extend westward along the Cambodian side of the border, thence to the War Zone C area in South Vietnam.

--On 9 January 1967, an unidentified Viet Cong/North Vietnamese army unit of approximately 400 men, all of whom spoke the northern dialect, moved from the vicinity

*Agent report

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of Nam Lyr Mountain (YU 775855) south to the intersection of the Dak Dam Det Streams (YU 794834). From that area the unit moved across the border into South Vietnam*. ^{/8}
--Le Van Mai (member of the 12th Company, 3rd Battalion, 141st Regiment, 312th Division). After leaving Laos he entered Cambodia where he traveled for approximately 1 month (April-May 1966). His unit entered Phuoc Long province, South Vietnam on 17 May 1966. ^{/9}

--Reportedly a North Vietnamese Army unit with a strength of 2,000 men left Hanoi in October 1966. The men traveled through Laos and Cambodia, and after passing through Snoul (XU 550340), Kratie province, crossed into South Vietnam in early January 1967.* ^{/10}

Logistical Support on the Trails

North Vietnamese captives provided accounts of their southward trek through Cambodia. They described the way-stations at which they rested and how they were supplied with food and guides during their march.

--Pham Van Vinh (Viet Cong captive of the 9th Battalion, 66th Regiment, 304th Division; captured 8 November 1965, Pleiku province) stated that three supply points in Cambodia were manned by North Vietnamese Army personnel and all contained adequate amounts of rice. Movement through

*Agent report

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Cambodian territory was by marching during the day, and crossing streams was in wooden boats operated by North Vietnamese Army personnel. /11

--Nguyen Truong Bang (member of the 2nd Battalion, 101st Regiment, 325th Division; captured 14 November 1965, Pleiku province) whose unit infiltrated through Laos and Ratanakiri province (Cambodia), before entering Pleiku province (South Vietnam) in September 1965 related that during the four day trip through Cambodia his unit was periodically resupplied with goods which were stored near the trail. Each of the supply stations was manned by approximately 7 North Vietnamese Army soldiers. This unit was reportedly observed, but not challenged, by Cambodian Army troops. /12

--Tran Sanh Dao (member of the 13th Company 101st Regiment, 325th Division; captured 1 November 1965, Pleiku province) stated that each of the supply stations in Cambodia was located 200 meters off the main trail and each was operated by North Vietnamese soldiers. Guides, all North Vietnamese, were changed daily at each supply station. According to Dao, his unit encountered Cambodian civilians who appeared to be quite friendly; however, he claimed that his unit did not come upon any Cambodian military installations or personnel. /13

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--Pham Hong Ha (1st Company, 1st Battalion, 101st Regiment, 325th Division; captured 2 November 1965) reported that when his battalion was to cross into Cambodia, his unit was blocked by two squads of Cambodian soldiers. Reportedly, Ha's battalion commander spoke Cambodian. He showed the Cambodian soldiers documents and after a short delay, the unit was allowed to proceed. The battalion followed a jungle path in Cambodia and North Vietnamese personnel resupplied the infiltrators with rice. At the southernmost station Ha reported having seen rice being brought to the station on two elephants. He said that following the encounter at the border he saw a few native huts and some Montagnards looking for food; however, he did not talk with any Cambodian civilians. /5

--Do Van Tranh (member of the 1st Squad, 1st Platoon, 1st Company, 602nd Battalion) related that some supply stations had 1 house, others had 2 which were used for food storage. Two North Vietnamese personnel were at each station. These 2 soldiers would guide the unit to the next station, where 2 other guides would meet the unit. Stations were 15 to 20 kilometers apart, depending upon the terrain. /6

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1. DOD Report No. 6075 2052 66, 30 June 66. CMIC Interrogation Report No.

US 107-66/0863, 14 May 66, CONFIDENTIAL -

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2. DOD Report No. 6075 1057 66, 12 May 66. CMIC Interrogation Report No.

US 32-66/1050A, 9 May 66, CONFIDENTIAL -

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3. DOD Report No. 6075 2054 66, 1 July 66, CMIC Interrogation Report No.

US 90-66 1105, 29 May 66, CONFIDENTIAL -

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4. DOD Report No. 6075 3582 66, 5 August 66, CMIC Interrogation Report No.

US 217-66/1020-1, 26 July 66, CONFIDENTIAL -

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5. DOD Report No. 6075 3033 66, 25 July 66. CMIC Interrogation Report No.

US 121-66/0863, 19 July 66, CONFIDENTIAL -

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6. DOD Report No. 6075 2356 66, 4 July 66. CMIC Interrogation Report No.

US 75-66/1088A, 15 June 66, CONFIDENTIAL -

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7. DOD Report No. 6075 2519 66, 6 July 66, CONFIDENTIAL -

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8. DOD Report No. 6075 2222 67, 24 January, 67 CONFIDENTIAL.

9. DOD Report No. 6075 5903 67, 8 March 67. CMIC Interrogation Report No.

US 083-67, 4 March 67, CONFIDENTIAL.

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10. J-2 MACV INTSUM No. 49-67, Supplement, CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN.

11. DOD Report No. 6075 0529 66, 22 March 66, CMIC Interrogation

Report No. US 3-66/0870, CONFIDENTIAL -

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12. CS 311/09262-66, 8 July 66. CMIC Interrogation Report No.

US 33-66/1035A, CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN.

13. DOD Report No. 6075 1629 66, 14 June 66. CMIC Interrogation

Report No. US 68-66/1031B, 7 June 66, CONFIDENTIAL -

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EVIDENCE OF VC/NVA BASE AREAS IN CAMBODIAI. Evidence from Captured Documents and Interrogations

Captured documents and interrogation reports reveal that the VC/NVA forces have been using base areas in Cambodia and that they plan to continue to do so. The bases are used to take refuge for varying periods of time, to support the infiltration route, to direct and support operations in South Vietnam, and to conduct cross border operations. They vary in size and configuration, depending on their use and on the section of the border in which they are located. Some bases consist of regiment-support size, permanent-type complexes with command, logistics, medical, and defensive facilities. Bases are usually established and operated covertly, although local Cambodian authorities sometimes give their active support and approval.

Captured documents, obtained in the Tay Ninh area during the past two years, discuss mainly VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory adjacent to Tay Ninh province. Interrogations of prisoners, most of whom were taken in Kontum and Pleiku provinces, describe bases in Cambodian territory adjacent to those provinces. Sufficient indications are available from other areas, however, to demonstrate that Communist bases have not been limited to the areas mentioned above.*

*See Part II

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Listed below in chronological order is information from captured documents that reveals how the Communists have been using Cambodian territory.

--Minutes of a VC meeting held on 8 April 1966 to discuss taking refuge on Cambodian soil relate that, after reviewing the situation, it was unanimously agreed that

- a) when the VC need help, local Cambodian chiefs readily provided assistance and show cooperation in setting up living and messing facilities on a long term basis;
- b) VC security while on Cambodian soil was inadequate (i.e., air and artillery shelters were too visible and were not dug in the same pattern as those of the Cambodians; quarters were not camouflaged; smoke from cooking could be seen; paths were too exposed and could easily be detected); c) the Cambodians feared that secrecy had not been preserved and that the Allies would attack them. The Cambodians were also responsible for their acts to higher echelons; d) taking refuge on Cambodian soil was necessary because the percentage of sick and wounded in base areas in South Vietnam was very high. 1/*

--Letter dated July 1966 to the Chi Fu District Chief, Svay Rieng province, Cambodia, from the Commander in Chief,

* See Appendix A for source list.

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Border Defense Corps, NFLSVN Liberation Army, requested that he come to Ba Thu, Svay Rieng province, to discuss problems concerning frontier security with representatives of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) and the Liberation Army. To maintain security and to prevent Allied terrorist attempts, it was preferable for him to be escorted.2/

--Report on the Activities of C. 66 Party Committee during July and August 1966, related that a) after VC units took refuge in Cambodia in April 1966, some units (i.e., the entire agency with letter box number 1646B, the rear services element headed by Ba Te, and the element with letter box number 1852B) did not return to Vietnamese territory; b) one supply element of the political department, which previously was stationed at Lo Go, was bivouacked in Cambodian territory; c) the number of people who intended to move to Cambodia or who were preparing for their evacuation to Cambodian territory was increasing; d) in Cambodia VC agencies illegally cleared many trails and roads leading to riversides and forests.3/

A document dated 25 December 1966, disseminated 22 February 1967 and captured in Tay Ninh province about March 1967 entitled "Regulations

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Concerning the Border" provided instructions regarding the construction of bases and their evacuation as follows:

1. "Those units or agencies which have been permitted by the Border Action Section to build their bases across the border should comply with the regulations, i.e., they should select a well concealed location as the site for the camp, and they should not cut the trees."
2. "Upon being ordered to go back to our side of the border, we should, prior to our departure, erase all traces, such as places to hang up the hammocks, plastic sheets for our tents, bottles, milk cans, etc.,. We should pay particular attention to destroying the smallest piece of paper bearing Vietnamese letters. We should also carefully conceal the shelters and water wells which might be of use to us in the subsequent escapes to safety."4/*

Report No. 61/BC of Supply Group 80A, dated 1966 (day and month not specified) captured in Tay Ninh province 30 March 1967 requested that it be issued from 20,000 to 31,000 Cambodian Riels for use in case of evacuation to Cambodia during Allied sweep operations.5/

* In addition, the document contains an injunction that bases will be established on Cambodian territory only for convalescence purposes. We are unable to determine from the document, however, the extent of the area covered by this injunction or the time period over which it should apply.

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--Notebooks captured in northern Tay Ninh province in March 1967 described in detail the VC/NVA construction of a 40-kilometer road undertaken by NVA Engineer Battalion 611, beginning in February 1966. Eleven kilometers of road were built on Cambodian territory, to connect the Cambodian road network in Mondulhiri province, Cambodia, with Route 14 and the waterways in Phuoc Long province, South Vietnam. The whole road was built to support truck traffic, with the objective of transporting rice and medical supplies from Cambodia to Phuoc Long for the Central Committee for South Vietnam (COSVN) Rear Service Group 86. 6/

--A notebook captured on 21 December 1966 revealed that a political-military school for VC Military Region II was located in Cambodia in the vicinity of Ba Thu, Svay Rieng province. The school taught instructors who were to provide combat training for provincial main force and local units. The trainees were instructed to treat the Cambodian people, officers, and soldiers with equality in order to gain their support for the VC. 7/

--Document captured 31 March 1967 in Tay Ninh province reveals that rice was being shipped from South Vietnam to Cambodian territory by one of the COSVN rear service units in order to prevent its capture by Allied operations. 8/

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Numerous returnees and prisoners, captured during the past two years in the course of Allied operations in Pleiku and Kontum provinces, have reported on VC/NVA facilities and defensive positions in the South Vietnamese border area of Ratanakiri province. Recent testimony has further identified this area as the headquarters of the B-3 front which directs the Communist campaign in the western highlands of South Vietnam. In most cases the interrogees have very few details and only general impressions as to their whereabouts, but following is the more precise and detailed information obtained by interrogation.

--Nguyen Van Thanh (First Aid Man, Sergeant, captured in Kontum province on 30 October 1966) stated that he arrived in South Vietnam in October 1965 and his unit was based in Cambodia near Sinh village No. 2 (near YA 723033). While there his unit was supplied with rice that appeared to be Cambodian and was brought from a station located 15 kilometers north of the village. Subsequently wounded in the Chu Ba battle in Pleiku in late May 1966, he was evacuated to the Le Loi Divisional Hospital via a medical rest station (located in a square bounded on the north by YA 610280 and YA 623280 and on the south by YA 610267) where he and other wounded personnel rested for three days. The group of wounded then walked south for five days, crossing the Tonle San (Se San in South Vietnam) and Route 19,

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Prek
to the divisional hospital located south of the/~~Ia~~ Drang
(~~Prek~~ Ia Drang in South Vietnam) (probably in the vicinity
of YV 730920 to YV 780920 and YV 730890 to YV 780890. 9/
--Tran Van Nghiep (Private 1st Class, Le Loi Division,
captured in Pleiku province, Chu Pong Mountain area)
said that, while he was a patient in the "V 2" hospital
located in Cambodia about 6 kilometers from the Prek Drang
(Ia Drang) River (YV 695965) in October 1965 and in
June 1966, he learned the hospital had been in existence
since 1964 to supplement the Le Loi Divisional Hospital.
Tran also stated that the hospital could care for about
400 patients at the time he was there. In March 1966,
Tran's battalion was ordered to move into Cambodia to
move rice from one storage area in Cambodia (about YA 695111)
to other supply areas closer to the South Vietnamese border
(about YA 715035). Each storage area was guarded by
three or four armed personnel and was located in a
forested area. Each area consisted of two or three small
rice storehouses, containing 6 or 7 tons each, and nearby
buildings for other types of food. 10/
--Truong Ba Thien, (Senior Sergeant, 325B Division, rallied
in January 1967) said that after the VC defeat in the
battle of Ya Bo in August 1966, he was sent to attend

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a two-week reorientation course for cadres from platoon leader level up. The course was held in Cambodia at Front B3 and lasted from 20 August to 5 September 1966. During conversations with Front B3 cadre, source learned that the western highland region was Front B3's area of activity. Front B3 was responsible for drawing up battle plans, for commanding the VC units located in Vietnam's western highland provinces, and for holding frequent reorientation and training courses for subordinate VC units. Source did not know the exact location of Front B3's Command Section. He did know, however, that almost all Front B3 installations were situated in Cambodian territory. A barracks (coordinates YA 575429) was located close to the building in which source took his reorientation course. Both were in a complex situated in a sparse bamboo forest and including five wooden buildings. One of these was equipped with poles and antennas on the roof. The barracks was surrounded by communication trenches and tree hedges. A guard station, staffed by an armed platoon, was set up on the path leading to the barracks.

--In November 1966, after attacking Ya Breng Post in October and being bombed by B52's, source's regiment withdrew to Cambodia to await replacements. He decided to rally, and on 29 January 1967 he walked alone along Route 19 to the

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first Cambodian post. The Cambodian soldiers permitted him to continue without questioning. An hour later, he came to the second post. Source, upon being questioned, told the Cambodian soldiers that he was going to Saigon. He had heard when he was with his unit that Cambodian soldiers were always sympathetic toward liberation troops and willingly guided them in the direction they must go, either to Hanoi or to Saigon. The Cambodian soldiers gave him some rice and chicken and sent a soldier to guide him to the frontier. 11/

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Eastern Ratanakiri

Eastern Ratanakiri province from the area of the Tonle San (Se San in South Vietnam) south across Route 19 to the Prek Drang Valley (Ia Drang in South Vietnam) appears to be the most extensive area in Cambodia being used as a VC/NVA base. This base is centered in South Vietnam but extends into a strip of Cambodia territory about 5 to 10 miles in width and 25 miles in length. This portion of the base in Cambodia forms part of the logistical system for acquisition and storage of supplies. It also provides facilities in Cambodia for sanctuary, hospitalization, rest, and training.

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Agent reports also describe in detail some of the base facilities revealed in photography and mentioned by interrogees. Following is the type of information available from agent reports.

--Sources stated in May 1967 that an NVA base camp was located on Chi Cham Mountain (YA 759005). It consisted of 6 large thatched huts, each 10 meters by 10 meters, surrounded by 30 smaller huts each 5 meters by 8 meters. In the center of the camp, source observed 4 metal antennas mounted on the tops of trees. The antennas had wires leading to 4 of the huts. Source was invited to enter the camp because he gave wine and chicken to the soldiers. He described the heavy weapons in the camp and said there were 1,000 NVA soldiers and 500 Montagnard VC in the camp. 12/

--On 14 December 1966 source observed a VC/NVA training post at YV 789995. The post served as a training site for an unidentified VC/NVA force of 600 men who had recently arrived at the site. A field kitchen was located about 30 meters south of the post. Three huts were located 50 meters south of the post. Each hut measured 10 meters long and four meters wide. 13/

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Southeastern Mondulkiri

Another major base is situated in Cambodia at Mt. Nam Lyr 80 miles south of the Prek Drang Valley. The base area extends from the South Vietnamese border some 15 miles west in the vicinity of feeder roads extending from the southern portion of Route 141. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong support activity, reported since early 1966, has become particularly pronounced since the beginning of 1967. Photography has revealed a high concentration of probable insurgent facilities adjacent to and at the terminus of motorable access roads between YU 715700 and YV 637109, comparable to Communist activity in the Laotian Panhandle.

The major supporting vehicular artery in the area is a circular unnumbered road about 35 miles in length connecting Route 14 and Route 141. At least thirty of the identified probable insurgent facilities in the area are located adjacent to two access roads which extend from the unnumbered road toward the South Vietnam border. Both the unnumbered road and the access roads exhibit evidence of frequent vehicular activity. Four encampments have been identified immediately south of the Nam Lyr mountain area.

Defector and agent reports relating to Communist use of this area are summarized as follows:

--On February 4, 1967, a convoy of 15 Cambodian GMC trucks carried 200 sacks of rice (100 kg. each, total of 22 tons), 60 sacks of dried fish, and 20 tins of fish sauce from

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Camp Le Rolland to Buon Muor (YU 689776). At that point the supplies were loaded on elephants and carried to a VC supply base at YU 775855. 14/

--According to a July 14, 1966 report, a VC camp consisting of 10 thatched huts, each measuring 6 x 45 meters, was situated at YU 775855. It was supplied from Camp Le Rolland (YU 558650) thence through YU 690750 and Buon Y Miar Klang (unlocated). Supplies were carried on elephants to the camp. 15/

--According to a February 1967 report, two VC platoons were located at Buon Bo Dra (YU 775816). 16/

--A Communist headquarters is located in a cave about 3 km. southwest of Kav Khle (YU 752775). Units were operating in this area for two years. 17/

Ad Hoc Interagency Committee on Cambodia

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Source List

1. DOD Report No 6075 0925-66, 2 May 66. Enemy Document Log No.
4-1403-66. Confidential - [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
2. DOD Report No 6075 0746-67, 11 January 67. Enemy Document Log No.
01-1188-67. Confidential.
3. DOD Report No 6026 4022-67, 13 May 67. Enemy Document Log No.
05-1396-67. Confidential.
4. DOD Report No 6075 8691-67, 31 March 67. Enemy Document Log No.
03-2705-67. Confidential.
5. DOD Report No 6026 3068-67, 5 May 67. Enemy Document Log No.
05-1254-67. Confidential.
6. DOD Report No 6027 2143-67, 29 April 67. Enemy Document Log No.
03-1385-67. Confidential.
7. DOD Report No 6075 3025-67, 1 February 67. Enemy Document Log No.
04-047-67. Confidential.
8. DOD Report No 6026 0272-67, 13 April 67. Enemy Document Log No.
04-2025-67. Confidential.
9. National Interrogation Report Nos. 515/67, 516/67, 517/67.
National Interrogation Case Nos. 048/7/67, 048/8/67, 048/9/67
dated May 30, 1967. Confidential.

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10. National Interrogation Report Nos. 650/66, 307/67. National Interrogation Case Nos. 117/2/66, 117/14/67, December 14, 1966 and March 31, 1967. Confidential.
11. DOD Report No 6075 6873-67, 16 March 1967. Confidential.
12. National Interrogation Report Nos. 368/67, 386/67 National Interrogation Case Nos. 037/1/67, 11 April 67 and 23 May 67. Confidential.
13. DOD Report No 6 026 6976-67, 5 June 67. Confidential No Forn.
14. DOD Report No 6 026 2717-67, 23 December 66. Confidential
15. DOD Report No 6075 6074-67, 4 February 67. Confidential No Forn.
16. DOD Report No 6075 4085-66, 14 July 66. Confidential No Forn.
17. DOD Report No 6075 3822-67, 7 February 67. Confidential No Forn.
18. DOD Report No 6075 5875-67, 27 February 67. Confidential No Forn.

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

TELEPHONE VOTE ACTION

SUBJECT : Request for Approval of SNIE 85-1-67, "Cuba: Likelihood of an Attempted Shoot-Down of a U-2", and USIB-D-24.7/5, Report of the Ad Hoc Interagency Cmte. to Prepare Documentation of Communist Use of Cambodia in Support of War in SV

REFERENCE : Telephone Message (see below)

DUE DATE : Before COB 30 August 1967

Agency	Vote	By	Date	
CIA	Concur in SNIE Noted USIB-D-24.7/5	[Redacted]	30 August	25X1
State	Concur in SNIE Noted USIB-D-24.7/5	(Mr. Johnson) Mr. Hughes	30 August	
DIA	Concur in SNIE* Noted USIB-D-24.7/5	* [Redacted]	30 August	25X1
NSA	Concur in SNIE Noted USIB-D-24.7/5	[Redacted]	30 August	
AEC	Abstain in SNIE Noted USIB-D-24.7/5	(Mrs. Wood) Dr. Reichardt	30 August	
FBI	Abstain in SNIE Noted USIB-D-24.7/5	Mr. Papich	30 August	

Following message phoned to USIB on 30 August.

We have been requested by [Redacted] after discussion with the State Department, to request telephonic concurrence in SNIE 85-1-67 and in USIB-D-24.7/5 without having a Board meeting this week. If the Board is willing to concur telephonically in these two agenda items, the Watch Report would also be cleared by telephone.

The specific USIB actions requested would be:

- Approval of SNIE 85-1-67.
- Recording that the Board noted the two Ad Hoc Interagency Committee papers attached to USIB-D-24.7/5. If the Board agreed to note these papers they would then be made available to the Joint Study Group which requested them.

Would you please check with your USIB Principal as quickly as possible and ~~Approved by DGI on~~ advise us whether he is willing to agree to these proposed

Board actions. We need to know as soon as possible in order to find out ~~Record~~ whether a Board meeting will be necessary.

Approved by DCI on: 30 August 1967

Record: USIB-M-485, Secretary's Note.

*Service Observers concurring in SNIE:

Navy Adm. Fluckey

AF Gen. Thomas

Army Gen. Yarborough

Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP82M00097R000800180002-3

**DIA, in concurring, submitted the attached suggestions by Adm. Fluckey and Gen. Yarborough.

Re: USIB-D-24.7/5

Adm. Fluckey: "Thinks that the people who receive the report should be made aware of the fact that it is not a complete report on what the country is doing."

Gen. Yarborough: Recommends that one small or several small maps that are annotated for more meaning be added.

1620, 30 August 1967
With [redacted] concurrence, 25X1
I informed Phil Johnson by phone that the USIB had officially noted the subject report, and therefore INR could make the two papers available to the Joint Study Group advising them of the Board's action.

I also, with [redacted] 25X1
concurrence, communicated the above comments by Admiral Fluckey and General Yarborough to Mr. Johnson for consideration by INR in connection with their transmittal of the papers to the Joint Study Group.

JH

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
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP82M00097R000800180002-3

Item 3

Discussion of the Report of the Ad Hoc Interagency Committee to
Prepare Documentation of Communist Use of Cambodia in Support
of the War in South Vietnam

Ad Hoc Group report for review by USIB; Sponsor - Mrs. Colbert

Pursuant to USIB action at its 23 March meeting, this report has been prepared for Board review as a response to a request by the Joint State/DoD/ CIA Study Group on Cambodia for a compilation of available intelligence data demonstrating Communist use of Cambodian territory for transit, base areas, bivouac, and 25X1
refuge.

 the
material has been organized to make clear the relative degree of sensitivity of the intelligence data included. The report consists of a transmittal memorandum from Mrs. Colbert of INR, State, discussing intelligence sources and declassification questions, and two separate papers on "Infiltration" and on "Base Areas."

At the 23 March meeting, Dr. R.J. Smith~~x~~ as Acting CIA Member~~x~~ suggested that, while the paper should be submitted to USIB for review, it should not become an official USIB document. Board review therefore is presumably expected to deal not only with the substantive content of the two papers, but also the form and method of handling them in relation to their proposed use by the

Joint Study Group.

Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP82M00097R000800180002-3

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29 AUG 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CIA Member, USIB

SUBJECT : Report of the Ad Hoc Interagency Committee to Prepare Documentation of Communist Use of Cambodia in Support of the War in South Vietnam (USIB-D-24.7/5, 7 August 1967)

1. This report is scheduled for USIB review as agenda item 3 for the meeting of 31 August 1967. The report was prepared by an Ad Hoc Interagency Committee under the chairmanship of Mrs. Evelyn S. Colbert of INR. The purpose of the report is to document Communist use of Cambodia in support of the war in South Vietnam. At the request of the Joint State/DOD/CIA Study Group on Cambodia, the report was prepared in a format that reflects the sensitivity of the intelligence data used, with the eventual purpose in mind of releasing all or parts of the report to the Cambodian government, other friendly governments, and possibly the general public.

2. The allocation of responsibility for the report was as follows: Infiltration (CIA/OCI); Base Areas (CIA/OER); and Sanctuary (DIA). The two studies assigned to CIA were completed and constitute the entire report of the Ad Hoc Committee. DIA failed to submit a report on Sanctuary (on the grounds the necessary data are contained in military operations reporting which cannot be retrieved).

3. The full report will fall short of meeting the requesters' requirements because it fails to discuss the sanctuary problem, lacks timeliness in some instances, and is based on data that are not easily declassified. A convincing case on the use of Cambodia for infiltration, and one that can be declassified fairly easily, can be made on the basis of the OCI paper. This paper fails, however, to present documentation on infiltration after the early months of 1966.

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4. There will be greater difficulty in making a convincing case, on an unclassified basis, of the use of Cambodian territory for base areas. The OER paper on Base Areas is dependent on four types of sources--captured documents, interrogations, agent reports, and photography. Although all of these sources combined present a substantial case, the agent reports and photography cannot be readily declassified and many of the analytical judgments used in the photographic analysis have already been questioned by [REDACTED] officers familiar with the subject. Although captured documents and interrogation reports can be more readily declassified, the number of these reports that are relevant to the issue is small. Therefore, the use of these sources alone will make it difficult to present a very convincing and comprehensive case to foreign governments or other parties.

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5. In sum, the report does not provide a thoroughly convincing public case on Communist use of Cambodia. I recommend, therefore, that this item be removed from the USIB agenda so that the State member can submit the report in draft to Ambassador Unger and determine his desires on the uses to be made of the several parts of the report. USIB members may then indicate by telephone their concurrence in the release of portions of the report for the purposes specified by Ambassador Unger.

6. Should the item be presented to the Board in its present form, I would have to recommend that only the paper on infiltration be approved for release to the Joint Study Group.

/S/

R. J. SMITH
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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